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Remaking retirement investors:  
Behavioural economics and defined-contribution occupational pensions 
 
Abstract 
Summoned-up within the defined-contribution (DC) plans that now predominate in the UK 
and USA, the financial subject of the retirement investor is identified by behavioural 
economics as the crucial problem to be solved in present-day occupational pension provision. 
Interventions are being made that: promote individual participation in plans through auto-
enrolment techniques; increase the rate at which individuals make tax-favoured payments 
into plans through contribution escalator schemes; and cater for the decision-making and risk 
management deficiencies of individuals by providing default option funds with in-built ‘life-
style’ and ‘target-date’ investment strategies. After Deleuze and Foucault, we argue that this 
‘behavioural revolution’ is a rearticulation of the heterogeneous elements which, in relation, 
produce the dispositif (apparatus) of DC plans as a distributed form of agency that places the 
retirement investor at its centre. Behavioural economics is shown to continue the inherently 
incomplete remaking of retirement investors within DC plans, necessarily precarious 
financial subjects who face the highly uncertain prospect that returns on investment after fees 
will be sufficient to meet their expectations of security in old age. 
 
Key words: retirement investors; behavioural economics; defined-contribution pensions; life-
style and target-date funds; apparatus of security. 
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Introduction: investing NEST eggs 
 
In May 2009, the Personal Accounts Delivery Authority (PADA 2009a) began a consultation 
exercise on the form that investment could take in what, since January 2010, has become 
known as NEST (the National Employment Savings Trust). NEST is the outcome of reforms 
in United Kingdom (UK) occupational pensions which, given shape by the Pension 
Commission’s wide-ranging review, target around seven million low-to-moderate income and 
typically female workers who are not enrolled in a plan and do not presently make dedicated 
retirement investments (DWP 2006a). While the Pension Act of 2008 requires that employers 
must provide and contribute to an occupational pension for their employees - thereby 
addressing ‘under-enrolment’ by ‘retirement undersavers’ (DWP 2006b) - since October 
2012 NEST has provided employers with an auto-enrolment defined-contribution (DC) plan 
which is guaranteed to meet legal standards. The PADA’s (2009a) consultation on NEST’s 
investment approach was concerned, then, with the decision-making and so-called ‘risk 
appetites’ of the would-be investors that NEST explicitly targets.  
 
Under DC occupational pension plans, the individual worker as retirement investor is 
expected to choose from a menu of mutual funds tailored for different risk appetites. But 
retirement investors have become known by policy-makers and industry practitioners versed 
in behavioural economics as individuals who, eschewing choice and the embrace of 
risk/return calculations, favour the default option mutual fund products that are usually on 
offer within DC plans (OECD 2009a). While proponents claim that its antecedents can be 
found in classical economics (e.g. Angner & Loewenstein 2012), behavioural economics 
consolidated from the late 1950s and especially during the 1980s and 1990s through an 
embrace of the theories and experimental scientific methods of psychology. Emerging as a 
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bona fide sub-discipline and increasingly infiltrating policy-making communities on both 
sides of the Atlantic, behavioural economics is characterised by a series of corrective and 
systematic claims about cognition in decision-making that challenge the utility maximizing 
assumptions made by neoclassical theories about homo oeconomicus (Heukelom & Sent 
2010; Rabin 1998).  Retirement investors are thus ‘reluctant investors’ for behavioural 
economists (Byrne, Harrison & Blake 2008), the consequence of certain psychological traits 
which are held to be especially pressing in long-term decision-making and under conditions 
of uncertainty (Benartzi & Thaler 2005; Kahneman, Slovic & Tvesrsky 1982). And, for the 
PADA (2009a), the reluctant investor problem is held to be particularly acute given the socio-
demographic characteristics of those targeted by NEST (cf. Clark, Strauss and Knox-Hayes 
2012).  
 
Because NEST investors could be predicted to take the default fund option, the design of that 
fund’s investment approach was of specific concern to the PADA. In setting out the 
alternatives, the PADA (2009a) concentrated on current debates over ‘life-style’ and ‘target-
date’ funds. Although differing in ways that we discuss in detail below, these funds are 
characterised by asset allocations that become ‘less risky’ as investors near retirement in 
order to ‘lock-in’ previous returns. While not explicitly siding with a target-date fund strategy 
for NEST, the PADA (2009a, 2009b) erred towards it. This inclination was confirmed by the 
results of the consultation in November 2009 and, in early 2011, NEST adopted an 
investment approach structured across 45 separate funds that each target a single annual 
retirement date over the coming years. Yet, and during the very period of the PADA’s 
consultation, target-date funds were the focus for a joint-hearing of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labor (DoL) in the United States of 
America (US) (SEC & DoL 2009). What provoked the joint-hearing was the across-the-board 
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poor investment performance of target-date funds in the financial crisis, and especially the 
sharp disparities between what were supposed to be very similar funds. For example, a survey 
of 30 different funds with a common retirement target-date of 2012 found that their negative 
performance during the first quarter of 2009 ranged from -1.7% to -12.2% (Glover 2009). 
Such disparities reflected different asset allocation strategies as funds neared their shared 
target-date. Those participating in the joint-hearing worried that retirement investors in 
target-date funds may be misled into thinking that their pension pot is necessarily safe. In 
turn, the joint-hearing debated whether common investment standards are necessary to 
preserve what is known in popular parlance as the ‘invest it and forget it’ status of target-date 
funds. 
 
This coincidence in recent UK and US policy-making on investment in DC plans provides us 
with an illuminating starting point from which to consider a particular financial subject: the 
retirement investor who, called-up within DC occupational plans and through wider 
transformations that serve to individualise responsibility and risk in pension provision, 
confronts considerable uncertainties (Langley 2006; 2008). As DC plans have replaced the 
collective insurance of defined-benefit (DB) schemes as the predominant form taken by 
occupational pension provision over the last two decades or so, private-sector employers 
typically no longer provide a ‘final salary’ or similar pay-and-service related guarantee 
regarding retirement benefits (Cutler & Waine 2001; Langley 2004; Munnell 2006). 
Individuals thus appear as responsible for their own pension provision within DC plans, 
deciding whether to join (or to opt-out if auto-enrolment is in place), choosing their tax-
deductible contribution rates, matching their risk appetites with mutual fund investment 
options, and ultimately facing the uncertain prospect that their investment returns minus fees 
(and the annuity rates that prevail at the point of their retirement) will be sufficient to meet 
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their expectations of well-being and security (Clark & Knox-Hayes 2007). But, as the above 
coincidence in recent policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic illustrates, what we want to 
critically scrutinise is the present ‘behavioural revolution’ that renders the retirement investor 
subject of DC plans as the explicit problem to be solved. Through technical interventions 
such as default fund design, behavioural economics seemingly overcomes the difficulties of 
DC plans. It thereby serves to depoliticise the dilemmas of occupational pension provision, as 
alternative problematizations are rendered invisible.   
 
What follows is divided into three sections. To begin, we outline how behavioural economics 
has forged the reluctant investor problem by questioning assumptions about homo 
oeconomicus which are traditionally hard-wired into DC plans. Behavioural economics 
stresses that individual economic decision-making is shot-through with apathy, inertia and 
miscalculation, and offers a range of solutions for DC plans that work with, rather than 
against, these tendencies. For those who celebrate or commentate on the behavioural 
revolution, these solutions amount to a ‘new paternalism’ on the part of governments, 
sponsoring employers, plan providers, consultants and so on which is said to be partially 
reversing the individualisation of responsibility and risk that has been carried forward by DC 
occupational pensions (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein 2009; Clark & Knox-Hayes 2009). The second 
section of the paper, in contrast, draws on the broadly allied concepts of ‘dispositif’ and 
‘apparatus of security’ from Deleuze (2006) and Foucault (2007, 2008) to provide a critical 
mapping of the behavioural revolution which challenges established models of action and 
agency in DC plans. We argue that the behavioural revolution is a rearticulation of the 
heterogeneous elements which, in relation, produce DC plans as a distributed form of agency 
within which the financial subject of the retirement investor is being remade. As the final 
section of the paper then shows, the on-going precariousness of the retirement investor arises 
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in large part from the inherent incapacity of commercial risk devices in DC plans to 
successfully manage the highly uncertain financial future, and therefore to deliver returns on 
investment after fees which are consistently sufficient to meet individuals’ expectations of 
security in old age. We address the implications of our analysis for the politicisation of 
behavioural economics and occupational pensions in our concluding remarks. 
 
In a DC world, reluctant investors need a nudge 
What is often referred to as today’s ‘DC world’ initially emerged in the US during the 1980s, 
as a drift away from DB schemes began and accelerated thereafter (Mitchell & Schieber 
1998).  Successive governments were initially slow to recognise the potential significance of 
the 401(k) code of 1978 which establishes the taxation benefits that continue to apply to the 
majority of DC plans. Once this became apparent, however, Republican and Democrat 
administrations alike stimulated the take-up of DC plans by increasing limits on tax-
deductible contributions under the code (Munnel & Sundén 2004: 4-5). With the 
individualisation of responsibility and risk in occupational pensions that this move to DC 
plans carried forward, the retirement investor subject was called-up as a calculative, self-
disciplined and masculine figure who responded rationally to the ‘free money’ of matching 
employer contributions, tax incentives and the investment opportunities of risk/reward 
(Langley 2006). It became apparent, however, that large numbers were not enrolling in DC 
plans, and that those already enrolled often made poor investment choices which were likely 
to generate ‘sub-optimal’ outcomes (Munnel & Sundén 2004: 53-94; Choi, Laibson & 
Madrian 2005). In turn, policy and guidance produced by government agencies, consumer 
groups, providers and consultants came to focus on improving information, transparency and 
the ‘financial literacy’ of the retirement investor to enable individual decision-making and 
risk management.  
8 
 
        
The DC world and its attendant financial literacy initiatives emerged relatively suddenly in 
the UK, as a crisis of final salary schemes was seemingly produced by the collapse of the so-
called ‘new economy’. While successive stock market bubbles had indeed and with hindsight 
been crucial to sustaining the growing obligations of DB schemes across a number of decades 
(Pensions Commission 2004), the bursting of the new economy bubble at the turn of the 
millennium provided an opportunity for the financialising and individualising rationalities of 
DC pensions to be rapidly embraced in the private sector (Langley 2004). What has marked 
the Anglo-American DC world more recently, however, is a set of common changes that, in 
effect, render the retirement investor subject as the explicit problem to be solved. Advocates 
and commentators herald these changes as a ‘behavioural revolution’ and ‘new paternalism’ 
in occupational pensions (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein 2009; Clark & Knox-Hayes 2009). Attempts 
to expand the number of workers enrolled in DC schemes no longer turn solely on tax 
incentives and  financial literacy campaigns, but  are increasingly grounded in insights from 
behavioural economics into ‘present-biased preferences’ which produce ‘procrastination’ and 
‘inertia’ in retirement investors (Benartzi & Thaler 2005). So, when the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006 made the future development of DC plans which cover 38% of the workforce in 
the US an explicit public policy concern for the first time, it gave increased legal and 
regulatory support to employer-sponsored 401(k) plans in which employees were 
automatically enrolled (with the choice of opting-out) (Darlin 2006). This move from opting-
in to opting-out of the DC world is also now apparent in the UK. In seeking to increase 
individual enrolment in DC plans and recommending the establishment of the National 
Pension Savings Scheme (NPSS) that became NEST, for example, the Pension Commission 
(2004: 208; 2005: 68-9) drew on behavioural economics in order to show that financial 
literacy initiatives were largely ineffective.      
9 
 
     
The analysis and agenda of behavioural economics in the DC world highlights that the inertia 
of what Byrne, Harrison and Blake (2008) call ‘reluctant investors’ extends beyond 
enrolment and into decision-making over contribution rates. Benartzi and Thaler’s (2005) 
Save More Tomorrow solution is lauded by behavioural economists as a way of addressing 
insufficient payments into plans, especially when plans are of the auto-enrolment variety and 
where the default contribution rate is low at 2-3% of wages. Save More Tomorrow is a 
response to ‘present-biased preferences’, and to the unwillingness that these are said to 
generate for corrective increases in contribution rates. It invites DC plan participants to 
commit themselves in advance to a series of increases in their contribution rate that, 
escalating up to the tax-preferred maximum, are synchronized with future pay rises. The take-
home-pay of workers in DC plans with a Save More Tomorrow element therefore appears not 
to be eroded by increased retirement investment, and they are deemed likely to continue to 
make a relatively high-level of contributions. Adopted first in the US in 1998, the Save More 
Tomorrow technique now features in DC plans provided and administered by some of the 
industry’s leading companies, including Vanguard, T. Rowe Price, Fidelity, and Hewitt 
Associates.           
 
In terms of investment decision-making, meanwhile, members of DC plans are held by 
behavioural economists to ‘fear … making the wrong decision’ in an uncertain environment 
which ‘further implies that additional information and communications, although very 
important, will not by themselves convert the reluctant investor into an active one’ (Byrne, 
Harrison & Blake 2008: 209). When confronted by a menu of mutual fund options in a DC 
plan, investors typically eschew choice and instead plump for the default fund option when 
one is available. In the UK, for instance, where 84% of DC plans include a default fund, it is 
10 
 
the investment choice of 91% of all members (NAPF 2008). To return to Byrne, Harrison and 
Blake (2008: 209), what retirement investors are said to want is not more information, but ‘to 
have an expert make the investment decision for them’. And, as investment decisions are 
made on behalf of those who take the default option, the ‘expert’ debate over the most 
appropriate life-style and target-date asset allocation strategies for these funds has become a 
key feature in what Ezra, Collie and Smith (2009) call ‘DC Version 2.0’. 
 
For one of the key architects of the behavioural revolution and DC Version 2.0, Richard H. 
Thaler, solutions to the problem of the retirement investor are cast, more broadly, as a series 
of ‘nudges’ by  ‘choice architects’ infused with a ‘libertarian paternalism’ (Thaler & Sunstein 
2009). While liberal paternalism implies a programmatic application of behavioural 
economics – ‘self-conscious efforts, by institutions in the private sector and also by 
government, to steer peoples choices in directions that will improve their lives ’ (p. 5) – it is 
in occupational pensions that it has gained most traction to-date.
1
 As Clark and Knox-Hayes 
(2009: 59) have it, the impact of behavioural revolution and the evolving agenda that goes 
under the banner of “new” paternalism’ now needs to be recognised in academic accounts of 
occupational pensions, not least because it is said to produce a partial reversal in the 
individualisation of responsibility and risk which the advent of a DC world is widely 
understood to have produced.  
 
                                                     
1
 For a recent example of this wider application of behavioural economics to address issues such as tackling 
crime and reducing obesity in UK public policy, see the ‘mindspace’ work of the Institute for Government and 
the Cabinet Office (2010) and the subsequent Department of Health (2010) whitepaper. We would like to thank 
Will Davies for drawing our attention to this.   
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If the behavioural revolution is cast in these terms, employers, trustees, providers, 
consultants, fund managers and government agencies do appear to be becoming ‘choice 
architects’ who share new responsibilities with retirement investors. Indeed, behavioural 
research suggests ways in which legal barriers to the paternalistic acceptance of new 
responsibilities might be overcome (Byrne, Harrison & Blake 2008). But, claims that 
behavioural economics is having a revolutionary impact that partially reverses the 
individualisation of responsibility and risk in occupational pensions remain over-blown at 
best. This is primarily because the actions and outcomes of DC plans are explained as 
necessarily arising from the decisions and interactions of clearly identifiable and pre-formed 
individual and collective agents. To borrow terms from Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 5, 13), 
then, a critical understanding of the behavioural revolution and the remaking of retirement 
investors requires ‘a map’ rather than ‘a tracing’, as the latter would merely reproduce 
established models of action and agency in DC plans. 
 
The distributed agency of DC pensions 
 
Behavioural economics’ rendering of the retirement investor as the explicit problem to be 
‘nudged’ by newly paternalistic institutions follows from a deeply engrained model of 
economic agency that has recently been rounded on by the interdisciplinary literature known 
as ‘the cultural economy of finance’ (Pryke & du Gay 2007). Although encompassing a 
variety of perspectives, a uniting feature of this literature is ‘a shared focus on the 
heterogeneous ways in which objects and persons (firms, markets, consumers) are “made up” 
or assembled by the discourses and dispositifs of which they are supposedly the cause’ (p. 
340). This ‘shared focus’  has tended to be  taken forward through insights drawn from the 
pragmatist philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (2004) and their concept of ‘assemblages’, 
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and the actor-network theory of Latour and Callon. The result, particularly following Callon’s 
ground-breaking contributions to economic sociology, is an emphasis on the materiality of 
composite market agencies and the performativity of a wide range of ‘market devices’ in the 
constitution of ‘socio-technical agencements’ (Callon 2008; Muniesa, Millo & Callon 2007).    
 
From the perspective offered by the cultural economy of finance, what is needed to critically 
understand the move to DC Version 2.0 which turns on the remaking of retirement investors 
is ‘to take into consideration the modes of distribution of individual action … and to give up 
the study of individual agents’ (Callon 2008: 33). Behavioural economics’ denial of the 
retirement investor as a rational and calculative agent only serves to reinforce an 
understanding of action in DC pensions which is firmly centred on that same individual 
agent, albeit one who is now recast as psychologically-flawed and in need of assistance. By 
way of radical alternative, what Callon has in mind is ‘distributed agency’ that is ‘collective, 
in the precise sense of mobilizing a large number of (human and non-human) entities taking 
part in the action’ (p. 36). And, as Callon acknowledges, the concepts of distributed agency 
and socio-technical agencement are grounded in Deleuze’s (2006) discussion of Foucault’s 
notion of dispositif, something that Foucault (2007, 2008) later developed to explore what he 
termed ‘apparatuses of security’.  
 
Foucault first used the concept of dispositif to refer to ‘tools and devices’, thereafter 
elaborating it ‘to mean a device orientated to produce something – a machinic contraption 
whose purpose in this case is control and management of certain characteristics of a 
population’ (Rabinow & Rose 2003: xv-xvi). This ‘contraption’ is formed through ‘a kind of 
strategic bricolage’ (xvi), bringing together, in Foucault’s own terms:  
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a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural 
arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, 
these are the elements of the apparatus (in Rabinow & Rose 2003: xvi).        
 
Deleuze (2006) similarly stresses the heterogeneity of the elements or ‘lines of different 
natures’ that, in relation, ‘compose … and pass through’ a dispositif as ‘a multilinear whole’. 
And, in this regard, there are clear parallels between Deleuze’s diagrammatic-style 
conception of a dispositif and what he and Guattari term a ‘machinic assemblage’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2004: 98). As Deleuze (2006) suggests, however, while the concept of dispositif  
later comes to be central to Foucault’s analysis of power and order, his own dispositif and 
assemblages are marked by a fluidity, dynamism and relative openness that always to some 
degree escapes the ‘lines of force’ that are present within them (p. 340). Furthermore, for 
Deleuze, it is not only the case that ‘a production of subjectivity in an apparatus … must be 
made to the extent that the apparatus allows it or makes it possible’, but that the resulting 
‘line of subjectivation’ is also ‘a line of flight’ that ‘escapes the previous lines’ (p. 341).   
 
The concepts of dispositif and apparatus of security are, for us, crucial in two related respects. 
Critical inquiry comes to entail mapping how the relations of heterogeneous elements give 
DC plans their specific form and ordering power, and how the distributed agency of this 
apparatus seeks but can never completely secure the retirement of the individualised 
population of responsible and risk-taking investor subjects which it calls-up and places at its 
centre. If we begin this mapping with how behavioural economics now provides the ‘regime 
of utterances’ (Deleuze 2006: 339) in the dynamic distributed agency of the DC apparatus, 
and thereby renders the retirement investor as the  problem to be solved in occupational 
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pensions, it quickly becomes apparent that this closes-down alternatives to the DC world. For 
example, even when the relative benefits of the collective insurance of the apparatus of DB 
schemes are acknowledged - most notably their capacity to deliver guaranteed retirement 
incomes rather than potentially accumulate asset-based wealth - this is taken as an invitation 
to redesign DC plans (e.g. DWP 2008).  
 
Moreover, in the lines of economic theory that compose and pass through and the distributed 
agency of DC plans, it is apparent that behavioural economics builds upon a previous 
questioning of rational market action. When neo-classical theory rose to pre-eminence in 
economics, the bracketing-out of economy from society served to position psychology at the 
margins of the discipline (Bruni & Sugden 2007). But the disciplinary terrain to which 
psychology-infused behavioural economics has recently returned – not least by providing a 
seemingly adequate explanation of the problems and crises of financial markets since the turn 
of the millennium (Akerlof & Shiller 2009; Shiller 2001) – is quite different. This is because 
what Foucault (2008) term’s the ‘American neo-liberalism’ of the likes of George J. Stigler, 
Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz  has come to be influential since the 1960s (cf. Davies 
2010; Fourcade 2009: 152-60). Focusing on Becker and Schultz’s work on ‘human capital’, 
what is significant about American neo-liberalism for Foucault (2008) is that it holds that 
 
the starting point and general frame of reference for economic analysis … must be to 
try to bring to light the calculation – which, moreover, may be unreasonable, blind, or 
inadequate – through which one or more individuals decided to allot given scarce 
resources to this end rather than another (p. 222). 
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Thus, in the wake of American neo-liberalism, behavioural economics furthers the 
psychological analysis of problems of individual rational action which have been 
acknowledged by orthodox economics for several decades, but appears to provide more 
effective and scientific explanations of, and responses to, those problems. For American neo-
liberalism, homo oeconomicus is not ‘the partner of exchange’ but ‘an entrepreneur of 
himself’ armed with the innate and acquired ‘abilities-machines’ of human capital (Foucault 
2008: 225-9). In a DC world, behavioural economics thus provides a psychological analysis 
of the ‘genetics’ of retirement investors, and prescribes nudges as ‘the more or less voluntary 
formation of human capital in the course of individuals’ lives’ (pp. 228-9). Put slightly 
differently, in Deleuzean (2006) terms, behavioural economics is a ‘derivation’ of the line of 
subjectivation within the DC plan apparatus that previously sought to further information 
flows and financial literacy to advance human capital. It is not a ‘change in direction’, 
‘bifurcation’ or ‘fork’. 
 
Auto-enrolment, contribution escalators and default fund investment strategies have emerged 
as expert and machinic elements in the dispositif of DC plans. And, across these devices, it is 
perhaps default funds, replete with life-style and target-date investment strategies, which 
have ‘some extra nudging power’ (Thaler & Sunstein’s 2009: 38) and come to be what 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call ‘operators’. Operators are the efficacious machinic elements 
within an apparatus which, to borrow from Jane Bennett t(2007), express their own ‘agentic 
capacity’ as intelligent machines seemingly capable of providing for the retirement security 
of individuals. Common to UK DC plans from their outset, life-style funds comprise a 
portfolio of assets (usually a fund-of-funds structure) which, on an individual basis, 
progressively becomes ‘less risky’ as an investor nears retirement. This strategic shift is 
typically from equities into bonds and cash, taking place ‘automatically via a predefined 
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formula or algorithm’ which usually operates between 10 or 5 years prior to an individual’s 
retirement date (PADA 2009a: 11). In theory, this protects the annuity purchasing power of 
an individual’s DC pension pot. 94% of DC plans in the UK offer a life-style option and, in 
the majority of cases, that option is also the default fund (PADA 2009a: 70). Meanwhile, in 
the US, target-date funds came to the fore after the 2006 Pension Protection Act. But, it was 
the follow-up 2007 decision by the DoL to grant these funds ‘safe harbour’ status under law 
that catapulted them to prominence. Prior to this decision, the default option in US DC plans 
tended to be the least risky fund offered on the menu, such as a money market fund or a fund 
invested in triple-A rated bonds. After this decision, however, plan sponsors who 
automatically enrolled members in a target-date fund by way of default were shielded from 
legal liability for that fund’s performance. Investment in target-date funds exploded. By mid-
2009, and in the auto-enrolment plans that account for about half of all DC plans available to 
US workers, 8 out of 10 had target-date funds as their default option (Glover 2009). In a 
target-date fund - for example, a 2030 fund - the whole investment structure of the fund 
becomes ‘less risky’ as the target date nears, although managers retain flexibility for so-called 
‘tactical asset allocation’ decisions in response to market conditions. 
 
Uncertain Returns and Precarious Subjects 
In seeking to solve the reluctant investor problem through default fund design, the 
behavioural revolution displaces investment risk management from individuals to the 
apparently expert calculations already present within the operations of default fund products 
themselves. It remains the case, nonetheless, that the assurances of individual retirement 
security provided by the DC dispositif continue to hinge on commercial calculative devices of 
risk/reward, fund management and investment in the uncertain circulations of financial asset 
markets. Despite, and arguably at least in part because of the recent behavioural revolution, 
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occupational pension provision continues to turn on a DC dispositif that retains what Foucault 
(2007: 20) marks out as ‘pretty much the essential characteristic of the mechanism of 
security’. That is, this apparatus ‘works on the future’, ‘not according to a static perception of 
what would ensure the perfection of the function there and then, but will open onto a future 
that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measureable’.  
 
The incapacity of commercial calculative devices of risk/return to consistently capture the 
‘material givens’ (Foucault 2007: 19) of future asset market uncertainties, and to bring the 
semblance of order necessary for those uncertainties to be managed as risks, ensures that the 
investor subject placed at the centre of the distributed agency of DC plans remains 
necessarily insecure and constantly remade. Two sets of uncertainties are crucial. Each set 
may independently contribute to the precariousness of retirement investing, but in 
combination they turn the experience into something of a lottery. First, macroeconomic or 
conjunctural shifts tend to alter the performance and risk/return profiles of different asset 
classes, under conditions where the financial future may not strongly resemble the past. 
Second, returns for DC investors are also dependent on the asset allocations of the various 
anonymous experts and strategies that manage their fund portfolios, where performance is 
diverse across funds and erratic over a lifetime. Added to these uncertainties over returns are 
the vicissitudes of labour market and household experience. While what are known as 
‘biographic disruptions’ are widely acknowledged in accounts of bankruptcy, they are set-to-
one-side as behavioural economics continues to place a largely monolithic and disconnected 
financial subject at the centre of DC investment. We will deal with each of these 
imponderables in turn. 
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If the performance of DC plans is often diverse and erratic, it is partly because the risks and 
returns associated with different asset classes are strongly shaped by what, after Braudel 
(1982), we refer to as a ‘conjuncture’ and define as a distinctive but unstable constellation of 
financial market events, typically lasting four to seven years. Conjunctures are partly marked 
by a capital market configuration of asset prices, flows of funds and interacting fund 
managers and other intermediaries, and may make certain investments seem attractive over 
the short to medium term, only to falter dramatically as confidence shifts (Engelen et al. 
2010). This was the case with the new economy bubble which was driven by a boom in 
venture capital funding, an explosion in new technology initial public offerings (IPOs) and a 
supporting narrative about the falling costs of information (Feng et al. 2001), just as the sub-
prime boom was driven by low interest rates, cheap wholesale funding, technologies of 
securitisation, and the rhetorical promise that innovation in liquid financial markets could 
efficiently and safely manage risk (Engelen et al., 2012).  
 
The risk/return characteristics of the assets that comprise the portfolios of DC retirement 
investors are not fixed or endogenous to those assets, but rather they reflect the 
configurations of a conjuncture (Holmes 2009; Erturk et al., 2010). This is particularly 
significant for reluctant investors in default life-style or target-date funds. During a target-
fund investor’s working life, for example, expert practices of tactical asset allocation are 
supposed to ensure that they benefit from short- and medium-term price rises in particular 
assets. Indeed, for the PADA (2009a: 48), ‘increasing investments in relatively more 
attractive markets and reducing the holdings in less attractive markets’ is precisely the main 
advantage that target-date funds are said to have over life-style funds. Yet, the risk/return 
characteristics of ‘attractive’ asset markets are conjunctural. And, as the circulations of 
financial asset markets move from one conjuncture to another, it may become far from 
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apparent which assets are ‘safe’ and which are ‘risky’. Since the Spring of 2010, for example, 
it has not been clear whether long-dated government bonds are safe, with investor opinions 
divided on whether we are headed for a period of deflation due to government fiscal austerity 
where bond values and coupon payments remain robust against declining prices, or a period 
of inflation due to quantitative easing where rising prices would erode the real value of 
coupon payments. Sovereign defaults are also possible and continue to seem quite probable. 
Thus, the operations of target-date funds post August 2007 have had to determine whether to 
lock in the equity losses of the height of the crisis by moving into bonds which remain at 
historic lows and may carry hidden risks (Authers 2010).  
 
More broadly, should a sudden conjunctural downturn in assets prices occur as a retirement 
investor nears their retirement, or at the point immediately prior to their life-style or target-
date fund shifting into ‘less risky’ assets, this will sharply diminish their retirement income, 
particularly if the final lump sum is used to purchase an annuity. The importance of timing in 
DC fund returns also means that the long-run average performance of certain asset classes 
may be less important for returns than short- or medium-term price movements. So, despite 
the widely acknowledged superior long run performance of equities over fixed income 
investments (Barclays 2007), as Figure 1 shows the return on UK equities between 1999-
2009 was dismal, yielding an average of -1.2% per annum over that period despite a mini 
bull-run from the Spring of 2009 to the present. The poor performance of equities, especially 
after the August 2007 and September 2008 crashes, hit pension portfolio values and fund 
balances hard because around 60% of total UK pension fund assets were then held as equities 
(OECD 2009b). Overall, UK DC portfolio values fell 25%, from £550 billion to $410 billion, 
between September 2007 and January 2009 (Aon Consulting 2009). The result between 2007 
and 2010 was the emergence of a cohort of near-retirement investors who were faced with the 
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decision of whether to accept reduced pensions due to investment losses and low annuity 
rates, or to defer retirement until such a time as returns improve (Giles 2009; OECD 2009b).  
 
Insert Figure 1 here:  
 
Uncertainty and variability in returns from DC retirement investment may not arise solely 
from conjunctural cycles and downturns in asset prices. The diverse asset allocation strategies 
of different fund managers, the fees and other charges levied on fund members, and the size 
of a fund may also generate considerable uncertainties over returns. It is estimated that almost 
70% of Britain’s largest equity pension funds actually lost investors’ money in real terms 
between 1998 and 2008 (Right Annuity 2008), illustrating that average performance levels 
disguise significant discrepancies in returns within and between funds. Moreover, research by 
Brien et al. (2009) found that rates of return and volatility varied significantly on 2010 target-
date funds, which broadly reflected asset allocation decisions, with some holding up to 60% 
equities despite being just two years from maturity. Brien et al. (2009) also found that returns 
varied greatly even within the same fund families - e.g. equities focused or fixed-income 
focused or emerging market focused etc. - largely as a result of differences in the fees levied 
by fund. The tendency for annual fund management fees and other charges to be calculated as 
a percentage of a DC plan participant’s assets also compounds the experience of uncertainty 
and precariousness, as the impact of fees is felt, disproportionately, by small investors 
(Stokes 2001). Further, in terms of size, risk and volatility, small funds may be less able to 
diversify and spread their investments, making them more susceptible to conjunctural 
downturns in particular asset classes (Brien et al. 2009). 
 
The attainment of adequate retirement income through DC investment is further complicated 
by the unpredictable ‘life course’ of many investors. Behavioural economics works on the 
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investor as a monolithic figure, and does not take account of ways in which household and 
family relations and subject performances impact on investment decisions and risk 
propensities (Clark and Strauss 2008). Typically, an individual’s ability to invest in the first 
place, and their contribution rate, is often conditioned by whether they live in a household 
with two or more income earners. The top 40% of households measured by income are 
largely households with two income earners, and in the UK this ‘fortunate 40%’ hold 80% of 
the value of total household savings and investments (Froud et al. 2002). Periods of 
unemployment or illness for one household member can impact on the contribution rates of 
another when current living expenses take priority. Divorce may also lead to long-term 
reductions in investment contributions. This is partly illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the 
contribution rates (i.e. pension fund investment as a % of total earnings) required by 
individuals to help them achieve the OECD average replacement rate (i.e. pension income as 
a % of pre-retirement earnings) of 59% after prolonged periods out of the labour market. The 
table assumes a real investment return of 3.5%, and shows that an average-earner in the UK 
with ten missing years of contributions would need to pay 7.9% of income into a DC plan in 
order to bridge the pension gap, whilst also working on average seven years longer than their 
French counterparts. 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here. 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
During the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the consolidation of behavioural economics   
contributed to a partial but discernible ‘loosening up’ of the discipline which also came to 
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feature evolutionary and institutional approaches (Heukelom & Sent 2010). While 
behavioural economics is not his focus, for Callon (2008) these developments gave rise to the 
entrepreneurial, creative and flexible figure he calls ‘homo economicus 2.0’. Unlike ‘homo 
economicus 1.0’ who ‘was highly introverted and relied only on himself and his own 
resources’, homo economicus 2.0 ‘draws on diverse material and emotional resources’, ‘relies 
on interpersonal networks’ and is readily recognised as needing ‘the assistance and 
institutional support that provides him with critical mental and cognitive resources’ (pp. 30-
31).  
 
When calling for the analysis of the distributed agency of homo economicus 2.0, Callon 
draws a distinction between two sets of policies ‘aimed at compensating for maladjustments 
encountered by individuals’ (p. 46). What he terms ‘prosthetic policy’, like the behavioural 
revolution in DC pensions that we have interrogated here, concentrates on ‘“repairing” the 
person concerned and/or at restoring the functionalities of which she is deprived’ (p. 46). As 
their proponents would have it, newly paternalistic prostheses – the technical nudges of auto-
enrolment, contribution escalators and default fund design - solve the problem of the 
apathetic, inert and miscalculating retirement investor. For us, however, behavioural 
economics does not signal a paternalistic sea-change in occupational pension provision, but 
rearticulates the heterogeneous elements that, in relation, give DC plans their specific form 
and ordering power as a security apparatus. The distributed agency of the apparatus continues 
in the wake of the behavioural revolution to seek to secure the retirement of the population of 
responsible and risk-taking investor subjects, even though it is now a behavioural version of 
homo economicus 2.0 that it calls-up and places at its centre. 
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Where our analysis of the behavioural revolution and occupational pensions departs from 
Callon’s (2008) account of homo economicus 2.0, however, is in terms of the prospects of the 
second set of policies that he identifies. Callon invests a large measure of hope in what he 
calls ‘habilitation policies’. Like prosthetic policies, habilitation policies ‘compose individual 
agencies’ but do not work from a given identity (e.g. the retirement investor) and instead seek 
‘an open range of associations, ties, and bonds, defined along with interactions and 
experiments’ (p. 45). Yet, in placing faith in habilitation policies which ‘aim … to construct 
socio-technical agencements’ that transform ‘individuals into interactive individual agencies’ 
(p. 49), Callon, in effect, accepts the individualised and depoliticising definition of policy 
problems that emerges from recent developments in economics, including the behavioural 
revolution. The critical understanding of the behavioural revolution offered here, in contrast, 
re-opens political space such that the problem itself can be reconsidered, that the collective 
dilemmas of occupational pensions can be problematised. Not only is it the case that the 
extant DC Version 2.0 been shown here to be hobbled by the weight of its own 
contradictions. It also seems inconceivable that the elements of the DC apparatus could be 
rearranged in such a way that individual agents could interactively secure their own 
retirements, even if those interactions entailed mutual understandings of diverse social 
environments or contexts (see Clark, Strauss and Knox-Hayes 2012). While the policy 
problem remains one of remaking investors such that they can better or more creatively 
provide for their own individual retirements, then the occupational pensions of all will 
continue to be exposed to the whims of future financial uncertainties.  
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